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AN ACCRETIVE OPERATOR APPROACH TO ERGODIC
ZERO-SUM STOCHASTIC GAMES
ANTOINE HOCHART
Abstract. We study some ergodicity property of zero-sum stochastic games
with a finite state space and possibly unbounded payoffs. We formulate this
property in operator-theoretical terms, involving the solvability of an opti-
mality equation for the Shapley operators (i.e., the dynamic programming
operators) of a family of perturbed games. The solvability of this equation
entails the existence of the uniform value, and its solutions yield uniform op-
timal stationary strategies. We first provide an analytical characterization of
this ergodicity property, and address the generic uniqueness, up to an additive
constant, of the solutions of the optimality equation. Our analysis relies on the
theory of accretive mappings, which we apply to maps of the form Id−T where
T is nonexpansive. Then, we use the results of a companion work to charac-
terize the ergodicity of stochastic games by a geometrical condition imposed
on the transition probabilities. This condition generalizes classical notion of
ergodicity for finite Markov chains and Markov decision processes.
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivations. In zero-sum stochastic games, introduced by Shapley [Sha53],
two agents are facing repeatedly a zero-sum game that depends on a state variable,
the evolution of which is governed by a stochastic process jointly controlled by
the players. The finite-horizon value vk is an equilibrium payoff achieved when the
players are optimizing their average payoff over the k first stages. A significant part
of the literature focuses on the study of asymptotic properties of vk as the horizon k
goes to infinity. Two main approaches are particularly followed. In the asymptotic
approach, one studies the convergence of vk toward some limit called the asymptotic
value. In the uniform approach, the problem is the existence of uniform optimal
strategies, i.e., strategies that are near optimal in any k-stage game with k large
enough, giving rise to the uniform value. We refer the reader to [NS03, MSZ15] for
background on stochastic games.
When the state space is finite (which we assume throughout the paper), the ex-
istence of the asymptotic value was proved for stochastic games with finite action
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spaces: first for particular classes of games (recursive games by Everett [Eve57], ab-
sorbing games by Kohlberg [Koh74]) and then in general by Bewley and Kohlberg
[BK76]. The result still holds for recursive and absorbing games with compact ac-
tion spaces and continuous payoff and transition functions (see [Sor03] and [RS01],
respectively). On the other hand, Mertens and Neymann [MN81] showed the ex-
istence of the uniform value for stochastic games with finite action spaces. Bolte,
Gaubert and Vigeral [BGV15] extended these results to “definable” stochastic
games, i.e., games whose data are definable in some o-minimal structure (e.g.,
when the action spaces and the payoff and transition functions are semialgebraic).
The uniform value also exists for absorbing games with compact action spaces (see
[MNR09]). We further mention that the existence of the uniform value is also guar-
anteed for Markov decision processes (equivalent to one-player stochastic games)
with bounded payoffs (see Renault [Ren11]). However, the asymptotic value (hence
the uniform value) does not exist for general zero-sum stochastic games, even with
standard assumptions on the data, i.e., compact action spaces, continuous payoff
and transition functions (see Vigeral [Vig13], see also Ziliotto [Zil16b] for a coun-
terexample in the framework of zero-sum repeated games with signals).
Zero-sum stochastic games have a recursive structure which expresses itself in
their dynamic programming operators, a.k.a. Shapley operators. From their anal-
ysis, it is possible to infer asymptotic properties of the games (see e.g., Rosenberg
and Sorin [RS01], Neymann [Ney03], Sorin [Sor04], Ziliotto [Zil16a]). In this paper,
following this so-called “operator approach”, we focus on the optimality equation
(known as average case optimality equation, Shapley equation or ergodicity equa-
tion) T (u) = λe+ u, where T : Rn → Rn is the Shapley operator of a game with n
states, and e denotes the unit vector of Rn, i.e., the vector whose coordinates are
all equal to 1. Indeed, if the latter equation has a solution (λ, u) ∈ R×Rn, then the
game has a uniform value, which is equal to λ for every initial state. Furthermore,
the vector u yields uniform optimal strategies.
Conditions which guarantee the solvability of the ergodic equation are usually
referred to as ergodicity conditions: they are recurrence conditions which ensure
some stability property of the state process. For finite Markov chains (equivalent
to zero-player games), the optimality equation can be seen as an instance of the
Poisson equation. It is well known that it has a solution if the transition matrix
has a unique invariant probability measure, or equivalently if the Markov chain has
a unique ergodic class. For Markov decision processes (equivalent to one-player
games), Bather [Bat73] showed that the ergodic equation has a solution when the
system is communicating, meaning that for each pair of states (i, j), there is a
stationary strategy such that the probability to reach j from i in finite time is pos-
itive. However, these accessibility relations do not easily carry over to the case of
two players. As a consequence, one usually imposes on the games a strong commu-
nication structure, such as being irreducible (resp., unichain), that is, one requires
the Markov chains induced by all pairs of stationary strategies to be irreducible
(resp., unichain, i.e., to have a unique ergodic class) (see e.g., [HK66, Vri03]).
In [AGH15a], Akian, Gaubert and Hochart obtained milder recurrence conditions
as a by-product of their analysis of the solvability of the ergodic equation. However,
the results only apply to stochastic games with bounded payoffs. In applications,
this boundedness property is restrictive and it is thus desirable to extend the results
to a broader framework. This constitutes the purpose of the present work.
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We further mention that the ergodic equation is a classical tool in the study
of stochastic games (as well as Markov decision processes) with a more general
state space. See e.g., [BG93, Sen94, AHS97] for countable state spaces or [GB98,
HLL00, JN01, Ku¨e01] for Borel spaces. Due to the technical difficulties inherent of
these settings, the different kinds of ergodicity assumptions made on these games
are much more involved than those previously discussed in the finite state space
setting. However, in all the papers mentioned above, these conditions all boil down
to the irreducible or the unichain case when the state space is finite.
1.2. Description of the main results. In this paper, we consider zero-sum sto-
chastic games with a finite state space and possibly unbounded payoffs that satisfy
some ergodicity property. Following Akian, Gaubert and Hochart [AGH15a], we
formulate the latter condition in operator-theoretical terms, namely, we say that a
stochastic game is ergodic if the optimality equation (a.k.a. ergodic equation) has a
solution for all perturbations of the payoff function that only depend on the state.
Let us note that, for finite Markov chains, this definition is one of several equivalent
manifestations of ergodicity, as discussed in [AGH15a]. One of our main result in
this framework of stochastic games (Theorem 2.6) is an analytical characterization
of the latter stability property in terms of boundedness in Hilbert’s seminorm of
some sets, so called slice spaces, which are invariant by the Shapley operator T of the
game. This stability result follows from a more general one (Theorem 5.1) which is
stated in the framework of nonlinear Perron-Frobenius theory (see [Nus88, GG04],
or [LN12] for background).
In a companion work (some of whose results were announced in [AGH15b]),
combinatorial criteria (of a graph-theoretical nature) for the boundedness of all slice
spaces of T are given. Using this result, we then provide a geometrical ergodicity
condition which is imposed only to the transition probabilities of the game. This
condition involves two disjoint subsets of states, called dominions, each controlled
by a different player, in the sense that each player can make one of these subsets
invariant for the state process. This communication structure readily generalizes
classical ergodicity characterization of finite Markov chains (see e.g., [KS76]) or
Markov decision processes (see e.g., [Bat73]).
Any Shapley operator T is monotone (that is, order-preserving) and additively
homogeneous (that is, commutes with the addition by a vector proportional to the
unit vector). These properties imply in particular that T is nonexpansive with
respect to the supremum norm, which makes Id− T an m-accretive mapping. Our
results are derived from the study of the latter map. Other results have been ob-
tained using such an “acccretive operator approach” (see Vigeral [Vig10] or Vigeral
and Sorin [SV16]), but contrary to them, our analysis exploits the nonexpansiveness
of T with respect to Hilbert’s seminorm. Furthermore, in addition to the solvabil-
ity of the ergodic equation, this approach allows us to extend our analysis to the
problem of uniqueness (up to an additive constant) of the solutions.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we recall the definition of zero-
sum stochastic games, we present the operator approach, and state our main results.
In Section 3, after some preliminaries on accretive mappings, we prove a surjectivity
condition for these mappings, which generalizes our ergodicity condition. In Sec-
tion 4, we infer from the previous section a result on the stability (under additive
perturbations) of existence of fixed points for nonexpansive maps. We also address
the “generic” uniqueness of the fixed point with respect to the space of additive
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perturbations. Finally, in Section 5, we apply these results to stochastic games and
prove the two main results stated in Section 2.
We mention that part of these results were announced in the conference proceed-
ings [Hoc16].
2. Ergodicity of stochastic games: preliminaries and main results
2.1. Zero-sum stochastic games. In this paper, we consider zero-sum stochastic
games with a finite state space and possibly unbounded rewards. They involve two
players which we call Max and Min. For the games to be well defined, we shall
assume that their sets of actions are Borel spaces, i.e., Borel subsets of a Polish
space, and given any such Borel space X , we will denote by ∆(X) the set of Borel
probability measures on X , equipped with the weak* topology.
A (zero-sum) stochastic game is a 7-tuple Γ = ([n], A,B,KA,KB, r, p) defined
by:
• a finite state space [n] := {1, . . . , n};
• Borel action spaces A and B for players Max and Min, respectively;
• Borel admissible action sets KA ⊂ [n] × A and KB ⊂ [n] × B: for each state
i ∈ [n], Ai = {a ∈ A | (i, a) ∈ KA} (resp., Bi = {b ∈ B | (i, b) ∈ KB}) denotes
the set of actions that are available to playerMax (resp., Min) in state i. We let
K = {(i, a, b) | i ∈ [n], a ∈ Ai, b ∈ Bi};
• a Borel measurable payoff function r : K → R;
• a Borel measurable transition function p : K → ∆([n]).
A stochastic game Γ is played in stages, starting from a given initial state i0 ∈ [n]
known by the players. It proceeds as follows: at each stage ℓ > 0, if the current state
is iℓ, the players choose simultaneously and independently some actions aℓ ∈ Aiℓ
and bℓ ∈ Biℓ , respectively. This incurs a payoff r(iℓ, aℓ, bℓ) given by player Min
to player Max, and the state iℓ+1 at the next stage is drawn according to the
probability distribution p(· | iℓ, aℓ, bℓ). Then (iℓ+1, aℓ, bℓ) is announced to both
players.
Denote by Hk = K
k−1 × [n] the set of histories of length k > 1. A (behavioral)
strategy of playerMax is a Borel measurable map σ : ∪k>1Hk → ∪i∈[n]∆(Ai) such
that, for every k > 1 and every history hk = (i1, a1, b1, . . . , ik) of length k, we have
σ(hk) ∈ ∆(Aik). In particular, the strategy σ is stationary if σ(hk) only depends on
the final state ik, let alone the history length k. Likewise, a (behavioral) strategy of
player Min is defined by a Borel measurable map τ : ∪k>1Hk → ∪i∈[n]∆(Bi). We
denote by S (resp., T ) the set of strategies of player Max (resp., Min). Also, for
any state i, an element of ∆(Ai) (resp., ∆(Bi)) is called a mixed action of player
Max (resp., Min), and when this action is a Dirac measure, we call it pure and
identify it with its supporting point in Ai (resp., Bi).
An initial state i ∈ [n] and a pair of strategies (σ, τ) of the players induce a
probability measure on the set of infinite histories, H∞ = K
N, the expectation of
which is denoted by Ei,σ,τ . Then, for every length k > 1, the k-stage payoff is
γki (σ, τ) = Ei,σ,τ
[
1
k
k−1∑
ℓ=0
r(iℓ, aℓ, bℓ)
]
,
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and the k-stage game starting in i has a value vki if
(1) vki = sup
σ∈S
inf
τ∈T
γki (σ, τ) = inf
τ∈T
sup
σ∈S
γki (σ, τ).
Throughout the paper, we implicitly assume that all the finite-stage values of the
games that we consider exist. We shall sometimes (but not always) make the fol-
lowing standing assumption, which ensures, besides the existence of the finite-stage
values, that the players have optimal strategies, that is, the infima and suprema in
Equation (1) can be replaced by minima and maxima, respectively (see [MSZ15,
Thm. I.2.4]).
Assumption A. For every state i ∈ [n],
(i) the action sets Ai and Bi are nonempty and compact;
(ii) the payoff function r(i, ·, ·) is bounded from below or from above;
(iii) for every pair of actions (a, b) ∈ Ai×Bi, the functions r(i, ·, b) and p(j | i, ·, b),
with j ∈ [n], are upper semicontinuous (u.s.c. for short), and the functions
r(i, a, ·) and p(j | i, a, ·), j ∈ [n], are lower semicontinuous (l.s.c. for short).
Remark 2.1. For all states i ∈ [n] and all pairs of actions (a, b) ∈ Ai × Bi, we
have
∑
j∈[n] p(j | i, a, b) = 1. This implies that the upper (resp., lower) semiconti-
nuity assumption of the functions p(j | i, ·, b) (resp., p(j | i, a, ·)), with j ∈ [n], is
equivalent to their continuity.
We emphasize that some of our results (in particular one of the main results,
Theorem 2.6) do apply to more general settings, for which the compactness of the
action sets and/or the continuity of the payoff and transition functions may not
hold. As an example, let us mention the following subclasses of stochastic games:
• Markov decision processes (equivalent to one-player games);
• games with perfect information, for which each state i is controlled by only one
player, i.e., the functions r(i, ·, ·) and p(i, ·, ·) only depend on the actions of one
player.
In any case, it worth noting that the payoff function may not be bounded, even if
Assumption A holds (see Examples 2.8 and 2.14).
A standard problem is to determine if the value vector vk has a limit in Rn when
the horizon k goes to infinity. When this limit exists, it is called the asymptotic
value of the game. Bewley and Kohlberg [BK76] proved that when the action spaces
are finite (along with the state space), the asymptotic value exists. But this result
cannot be extended to stochastic games with compact action spaces and continuous
payoff and transition functions (see [Vig13]).
Loosely speaking, the asymptotic value v = limk→∞ v
k exists when the players
are able to guarantee the same payoff, vi, up to an arbitrarily small quantity, in any
k-stage game starting in i with k large enough and known in advance. A stronger
notion of value, the uniform value, asks for both players to guarantee, up to any
small perturbation, the same payoff in any finite-stage game with a sufficiently
large but unknown horizon. Precisely, the stochastic game Γ has a uniform value
v∞ ∈ Rn if, for all ε > 0, there exist strategies σ∗ ∈ S, τ∗ ∈ T , and a horizon
k0 ∈ N such that, for all initial states i ∈ [n], for all strategies σ ∈ S and τ ∈ T ,
and for all k > k0,
γki (σ
∗, τ) > v∞i − ε and γ
k
i (σ, τ
∗) 6 v∞i + ε.
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The strategies σ∗ and τ∗ are called uniform ε-optimal strategies, or simply uniform
optimal if they are uniform ε-optimal for every ε > 0.
Mertens and Neyman [MN81] proved that the uniform value exists for stochastic
games with finite state and action spaces. This result was extended in [BGV15] to
games with a finite state space for which the data are definable in some o-minimal
structure. Note that when the uniform value exists, the asymptotic value also exists
and they are equal.
2.2. Operator approach. Using a dynamic programming principle, Shapley proved
in [Sha53] that the value of a finite-stage stochastic game satisfies a recursive for-
mula. This formula is written by means of the so-called Shapley operator. Given a
stochastic game Γ, the latter is a map T : Rn → Rn whose ith coordinate is defined
by
Ti(x) = sup
µ∈∆(Ai)
inf
ν∈∆(Bi)
{
r(i, µ, ν) +
∑
ℓ∈[n]
xℓ p(ℓ | i, µ, ν)
}
= inf
ν∈∆(Bi)
sup
µ∈∆(Ai)
{
r(i, µ, ν) +
∑
ℓ∈[n]
xℓ p(ℓ | i, µ, ν)
}
, x ∈ Rn,
(2)
where, for any Borel measurable map f : K → R, we introduce its bilinear extension
f(i, µ, ν) :=
∫
Ai
∫
Bi
f(i, a, b) dµ(a) dν(b), ∀i ∈ [n], ∀(µ, ν) ∈ ∆(Ai)×∆(Bi).
The quantity Ti(x) represents the value of a one-stage game with initial state i ∈ [n]
and an additional payoff xj if the final state is j ∈ [n]. As mentioned in the latter
subsection, we shall always assume – implicitly – that the Shapley operator is well
defined. This is particularly the case when Assumption A holds and, if so, the sup
and inf operators in (2) can be replaced by max and min, respectively.
Then, the dynamic programming principle introduced by Shapley writes:
(3) v0 = 0 and (k + 1)vk+1 = T (kvk), ∀k > 0.
As an immediate consequence, if the asymptotic value exists, then it is given by
(4) lim
k→∞
vk = lim
k→∞
T k(0)
k
,
where T k := T ◦ · · · ◦ T denotes the kth iterate of T .
The “operator approach” exploits the recursive structure (3) in order to infer
convergence properties of vk from the analysis of the Shapley operator T (see e.g.,
[RS01, Ney03, Sor04, BGV15, Zil16a]). The latter analysis makes extensive use of
the following properties, satisfied by any Shapley operator:
monotonicity: x 6 y =⇒ T (x) 6 T (y), x, y ∈ Rn,
additive homogeneity: T (x+ αe) = T (x) + αe, x ∈ Rn, α ∈ R,
nonexpansiveness: ‖T (x)− T (y)‖∞ 6 ‖x− y‖∞, x, y ∈ R
n,
where Rn is endowed with its usual partial order, e denotes the unit vector of Rn
and ‖ · ‖∞ is the sup-norm of Rn. Note that the last property can be deduced from
the first two (see [CT80]).
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A basic tool to study the asymptotic properties of the k-stage value is the ergodic
equation, also known as the average cost optimality equation or sometimes Shapley
equation:
(5) T (u) = λe+ u, u ∈ Rn, λ ∈ R,
where e := (1, . . . , 1)⊤ is the unit vector of Rn. Intuitively, this equation means
that if the players choose optimal strategies in the game with an additional ter-
minal payoff of ui when the last visited state is i, then the payoff at each stage is
equal to λ, whatever the horizon and the initial state. From this game-theoretical
interpretation or, in the spirit of the operator approach, using (4), the additive
homogeneity and the nonexpansiveness of T , one easily deduce that if the ergodic
equation has a solution, meaning that there exists a pair (λ, u) ∈ R × Rn satisfy-
ing Equation (5), then the asymptotic value of the game exists and is a constant
vector, whose entries are all equal to λ – we say that a vector is “constant” if it is
proportional to the unit vector. Note that there is a unique scalar λ for which (5)
holds, and for every α ∈ R, the pair (λ, u + αe) is also a solution to (5): we say
that (λ, u) is defined up to an additive constant.
When the ergodic equation is solvable the existence of the asymptotic value may
in fact be refined by the following known result. We state the proof for the reader’s
convenience.
Proposition 2.2 (Existence of the uniform value). Let Γ be a stochastic game such
that the ergodic equation (5) is solvable for its Shapley operator T . Let (λ, u) be
any solution. Then, the uniform value exists and is equal to the constant vector λe.
Moreover, both players have stationary uniform ε-optimal strategies, which can be
obtained from the vector u.
Proof. Let ε be a fixed positive real. For every state i ∈ [n], let µ∗i ∈ ∆(Ai) be an
action of player Max such that
inf
ν∈∆(Bi)
{
r(i, µ∗i , ν) +
∑
ℓ∈[n]
uℓ p(ℓ | i, µ
∗
i , ν)
}
> Ti(u)− ε.
Then, define the stationary strategy σ∗ of player Max such that the mixed action
µ∗i is selected whenever the current state is i.
We now introduce the Shapley operator T σ
∗
of a one-player game based on Γ
where the strategy of player Max is fixed to σ∗. Precisely, the ith coordinate of
T σ
∗
is given by
T σ
∗
i (x) = inf
ν∈∆(Bi)
{
r(i, µ∗i , ν) +
∑
ℓ∈[n]
xℓ p(ℓ | i, µ
∗
i , ν)
}
, x ∈ Rn,
so that T σ
∗
(u) > T (u)− εe = (λ − ε)e+ u.
Denoting by ‖u‖∞ = maxi∈[n] |ui| the sup-norm of u, we have, for all positive
integers k and all strategies τ of player Min,
γk(σ∗, τ) >
1
k
(
T σ
∗)k
(0) >
1
k
((
T σ
∗)k
(u)− ‖u‖∞ e
)
,
where the first inequality comes from the recursive property (3) applied to the
one-player game with Shapley operator T σ
∗
, and the second inequality stems from
the monotonicity and the additive homogeneity of T σ
∗
, along with the fact that
0 > u− ‖u‖∞ e.
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Let k0 be such that 2‖u‖∞ 6 k0ε. By construction of σ∗, we deduce that for all
integers k > k0, for all state i, and for all strategy τ of player Min, we have
γki (σ
∗, τ) > λ− ε−
2‖u‖∞
k
> λ− 2ε.
With dual arguments, we show that there exists a stationary strategy τ∗ of player
Min such that
γki (σ, τ
∗) 6 λ+ ε+
2‖u‖∞
k
6 λ+ 2ε
for all k > k0, for all i ∈ [n], and for all σ ∈ S. This proves that λ is the uniform
value of Γ for every initial state, and that (σ∗, τ∗) is a pair of stationary uniform
2ε-optimal strategies. 
We conclude this subsection with a sufficient condition for the solvability of the
ergodic equation (5), hence for the existence of the uniform value. To that purpose,
let us introduce the following two definitions. First, Hilbert’s seminorm of a vector
x ∈ Rn is defined by
(6) ‖x‖H := max
i∈[n]
xi − min
i∈[n]
xi.
Like any seminorm, it is a nonnegative function which is subadditive and absolutely
homogeneous (i.e., ‖αx‖H = |α| ‖x‖H for all α ∈ R and all x ∈ Rn). However it fails
to be a norm since ‖x‖H = 0 if and only if x is proportional to the unit vector of R
n.
It is a standard result that any monotone and additively homogeneous self-map of
R
n is nonexpansive with respect to this seminorm (see e.g., [GG04]). Second, given
a map T : Rn → Rn and real numbers α, β, we define the slice space
Sβα(T ) := {x ∈ R
n | αe + x 6 T (x) 6 βe+ x}.
Observe that if T is monotone and additively homogeneous (in particular if T is
the Shapley operator of a stochastic game), then any slice space is invariant by T .
Then we have the following.
Theorem 2.3 (Solvability of the ergodic equation, Cor. of [GG04, Thm. 9]). Let
T : Rn → Rn be a monotone and additively homogeneous map. If there exists a
nonempty slice space bounded in Hilbert’s seminorm, then the ergodic equation (5)
is solvable.
2.3. Ergodic stochastic games. Following [AGH15a], we introduce an operator-
theoretical definition of ergodicity for stochastic games.
Definition 2.4 (Ergodicity of stochastic games). A zero-sum stochastic game Γ
with Shapley operator T is ergodic if for all perturbation vectors g ∈ Rn, the ergodic
equation (5) is solvable for g + T , i.e., for the Shapley operator of the perturbed
game where, for every (i, a, b) ∈ K, the payoff is gi + r(i, a, b).
Example 2.5. Let us illustrate our notion of ergodicity with the following very
basic Shapley operators defined on R2 by
T(x) =
(
x1
x2
)
, T#(x) =
(
x2
x1
)
, T△(x) =
(
x1 ∨ x2
x1 ∧ x2
)
,
where ∨ stands for max and ∧ for min.
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(a) For g+T, the ergodic equation is solvable if and only if g is a constant vector
(and then any vector u is a solution). Hence T is not ergodic (in the sense that
the game whose Shapley operator is T is not ergodic).
(b) For g + T#, the ergodic equation is solvable with every g ∈ R2. The solutions
are then characterized by λ = 12 (g1 + g2) and u1 − u2 =
1
2 (g1 − g2). Hence T
# is
ergodic.
(c) For g + T△, the ergodic equation is solvable if and only if g1 6 g2. If g1 < g2,
then the solutions are characterized by λ = 12 (g1+ g2) and u1− u2 =
1
2 (g1− g2). If
g1 = g2, the solutions satisfy λ = g1 = g2 and u1 > u2. Hence T
△ is not ergodic.
In [AGH15a], several equivalent characterizations of ergodicity are given: in
terms of the recession operator T̂ (x) := limρ→+∞ ρ
−1T (ρx) and the asymptotic
value of the perturbed games (Theorem 3.1); in graph-theoretical terms (Theo-
rem 5.3); in game-theoretical terms (Proposition 5.1). Note that, as discussed in
the latter reference, all this equivalent criteria extend the classical notion of ergod-
icity for finite Markov chains. However, these results only apply to stochastic games
with bounded payoffs. They are all derived from a result that establishes a rela-
tion between ergodicity and the set of fixed points of T̂ – a game (with bounded
payoffs) being ergodic if and only if this fixed-point set is reduced to a line. In
general, this equivalence fails, as illustrated in Example 2.8, and so, the results
of [AGH15a] cannot be readily extended, for instance to games with unbounded
payoffs. Thus, the wish to find a statement for ergodicity which applies to any kind
of stochastic games has motivated the formulation of Definition 2.4. In this regard,
one of our main results, which we state hereafter, can be seen as a generalization
of Theorem 3.1, ibid.
Theorem 2.6 (Ergodicity and slice spaces). A stochastic game is ergodic if and
only if all the slice spaces of its Shapley operator are bounded in Hilbert’s seminorm.
We mention that the novelty of this result lies in the necessity of the second
statement. Indeed, it is easy to deduce the sufficient part from Theorem 2.3, as the
subsequent proof shows.
Proof – “if” part. Let Γ be a stochastic game for which all the slice spaces of its
Shapley operator T are bounded in Hilbert’s seminorm. Let g ∈ Rn be a state-
dependent perturbation of the payoff function of Γ. We first notice that 0 is in the
slice space Sβα(g + T ) for β = −α = ‖g + T (0)‖∞. Hence the latter is nonempty.
Then, denoting by m = ‖g‖∞, we have for every x ∈ Sβα(g + T ),
(α−m)e+ x 6 −me+ g + T (x) 6 T (x) 6 me+ g + T (x) 6 (β +m)e + x.
This proves that Sβα(g + T ) is included in S
β+m
α−m(T ), hence bounded in Hilbert’s
seminorm. It follows from Theorem 2.3 that the ergodic equation (5) is solvable for
g + T , and consequently that Γ is ergodic. 
Let us now illustrate the result, first with the basic Shapley operators of Ex-
ample 2.5, and then with a more involved stochastic game for which the results in
[AGH15a] do not apply.
Example 2.7. Consider the operators introduced in Example 2.5.
(a) The slice spaces of T are trivial, that is, Sβα(T
) is either empty if α > β, or
equal to the full space if α 6 β. Hence, since T has slice spaces unbounded in
Hilbert’s seminorm: it is not ergodic.
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(b) For T#, the slice space Sβα(T
#) is nonempty if and only if α 6 0 6 β. In that
case, it is equal to the set of points x such that |x1 − x2| 6 −α ∧ β. Hence the
slice space is bounded in Hilbert’s seminorm by −α ∧ β, which proves that T# is
ergodic.
(c) For T△, if the slice space Sβα(T
△) is nonempty, i.e., if α 6 β, then it contains
all points x such that x1 > x2. Hence it is not bounded in Hilbert’s seminorm and
T△ is not ergodic.
Example 2.8. Consider the perfect-information stochastic game with two states,
whose Shapley operator is given by
T (x) =
 sup0<p61
(
2(1− p) + log p+ (1− p)x1 + px2
)
inf
0<p61
(
2(p− 1)− log p+ px1 + (1− p)x2
)
 , x ∈ R2.
Player Max controls the first state and player Min the second. In state 1, player
Max chooses an action p ∈ (0, 1] which yields the current payoff 2(1 − p) + log p
and induces a probability p to switch to state 2. The payoff in state 1 is positive
for all p ∈ (p0, 1) (where p0 ≈ 0.2032), it attains its maximum at p = 1/2 and
tends to −∞ as p tends to 0. Hence, securing a positive stage payoff entails a
positive probability to switch to state 2, which is controlled by player Min. A dual
interpretation holds for player Min in state 2.
Letting h : R→ R be the function defined by
h(z) = sup
0<p61
(
2(1− p) + log p+ pz
)
=
{
1− log(2− z) (z 6 1)
z (z > 1)
, z ∈ R,
we can write T as
T (x) =
(
h(x2 − x1) + x1
−h(x2 − x1) + x2
)
, x ∈ R2.
It is then easy to check that all the slice spaces of T are bounded in Hilbert’s
seminorm, hence that the game is ergodic.
Furthermore, for all x ∈ R2 such that x2 6 x1, the recession operator of T is
given by
T̂ (x) := lim
ρ→+∞
T (ρx)
ρ
= x.
Thus, the fixed-point set of T̂ is not reduced to the line Re, which shows that the
results of [AGH15a] do not apply to this game.
In the conference paper [AGH15b] – a preprint of a longer version is available
in [AGH18] – the authors give a combinatorial criterion for the boundedness in
Hilbert’s seminorm of all the slice spaces of any monotone additively homogeneous
self-map of Rn. The combination of that result, which involves a pair of directed
hypergraphs, with Theorem 2.6 provides a generalization of the graph-theoretical
ergodicity condition in [AGH15a, Thm 5.3]. Similarly to Proposition 5.1, ibid., we
can then translate this condition in game-theoretical terms. With this end in view,
let us introduce the notion of dominion, informally speaking a subset of states that
one player can make invariant for the state process.
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Definition 2.9 (Dominion). Given a stochastic game Γ, we call dominion of player
Max (resp., Min) a nonempty subset of states D for which player Max (resp.,
Min) has a strategy such that from any initial position in D, the state remains
almost surely in D at all stages, whatever strategy the other player chooses.
We mention that an equivalent notion appeared in the algorithmic game theory
literature, first in [GL89], then in [BEGM10]. We further mention that the name
“dominion” was introduced in [JPZ08] with a definition slightly stronger that ours.
Example 2.10. Let us illustrate the notion of dominion by considering the fol-
lowing stochastic game Γ. It has 3 states and the action sets are [0, 1] for both
players in all states. We next identify probability measures on R3 with vectors
in the standard simplex of R3. The transition probabilities of Γ are given, for all
actions a ∈ [0, 1] of player Max and b ∈ [0, 1] of player Min, by
p(1, a, b) =
 γab (1− γa)
(1 − b) (1− γa)
, p(2, a, b) =
 γba (1− γb)
(1 − a) (1− γb)
, p(3, a, b) =
00
1
,
where γ is a fixed parameter in (0, 1). Since dominions are only defined by the
dynamics of the state, it is not necessary to specify here the payoff function of Γ.
It is then easy to check that the dominions of player Max are
{3}, {1, 2, 3},
whereas the dominions of player Min are
{3}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}.
We can now give a game-theoretical characterization of ergodicity, which extends
[AGH15a, Prop. 5.1].
Theorem 2.11 (Ergodicity and dominions). A stochastic game satisfying Assump-
tion A is ergodic if and only if the players do not have disjoint dominions.
Remark 2.12 (The dominion condition for Markov chains and Markov decision
processes). It is instructive to apply the latter theorem to zero-player or one-player
games, that is, to finite Markov chains with rewards or Markov decision processes,
respectively.
(a) In the first case, the two players are dummies, meaning that they have only
one possible action in each state. Any dominion (of any player) then contains at
least one ergodic class of the Markov chain and, conversely, any ergodic class is
a dominion for both players. Thus, the dominion condition in Theorem 2.11 is
equivalent to the classical ergodicity condition for finite Markov chains.
(b) For Markov decision processes, only one player is a dummy, say player Min.
Then, a dominion of this player is an absorbing subset of states for player Max
(meaning that the state remains almost surely in this set once it has reached it,
whatever the strategy of player Max is). In particular, it is also a dominion for
player Max. Since the intersection of two absorbing sets is itself absorbing, we
deduce that the Markov decision process is ergodic if and only if there is a unique
minimal nonempty absorbing set (with respect to the inclusion partial order) and
this set has a nonempty intersection with any dominion of player Max.
Example 2.13. Let us consider the games associated with the operators introduced
in Example 2.5.
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(a) For T, this is the trivial Markov chain, where every state is absorbing. Hence,
every state is a dominion of both players and thus the game is not ergodic.
(b) For T#, this is also a Markov chain, which is irreducible. Hence, each player
has only one dominion, which is the set of all state. Thus the game is ergodic.
(c) For T△, the nontrivial dominions are {1} for player Max and {2} for player
Min. We deduce from Theorem 2.11 that the game is not ergodic.
Example 2.14. Consider the stochastic game Γ (partially) introduced in Exam-
ple 2.10. Assume that the payoff function is given by
r(1, a, b) =
ab
a3 + b3
, r(2, a, b) =
−ab
a3 + b3
, r(3, a, b) = 0,
for (a, b) 6= (0, 0) and r(1, 0, 0) = r(2, 0, 0) = r(3, 0, 0) = 0. Then, Γ satisfies As-
sumption A, and since the players do not have disjoint dominions, it is ergodic. Fur-
ther observe that, since the payoff function is unbounded, the results of [AGH15a]
cannot be applied.
Remark 2.15. Theorem 2.11 suggests that ergodicity is a structural property, in
the sense that it only depends on the transition function of the game, and not on the
payoff function. We underline that this is true if and only if Assumption A holds.
Indeed, the transition structure of the game in Example 2.8 is essentially the same
as the transition structure of a game with Shapley operator T△ (Example 2.5): in
the former example, if the payoffs were set to zero, the Shapley operator would be
exactly equal to T△. However, the latter game is not ergodic, whereas the former
(which does not satisfy Assumption A) is.
3. Surjectivity of accretive mappings
The solvability of ergodic equation (5) can be seen, up to an additive constant,
as a fixed-point problem. In this perspective, it is useful to work in the quotient
vector space Rn/Re. Our definition of ergodicity (Definition 2.4) then boils down
to the existence of a fixed point for all additive perturbations in Rn/Re of [T ], the
quotiented version of the Shapley operator T or, equivalently, to the surjectivity of
the quotiented map Id− [T ], where Id denotes the identity map. It turns out that
the quotiented map [T ] is nonexpansive, which implies that Id− [T ] is accretive (see
Definition 3.6 below). This motivates us to study the existence stability of a fixed
point, under additive perturbations, for nonexpansive maps in (finite-dimensional)
Banach spaces, as well as the related and more general problem of the surjectivity
of accretive set-valued mappings. The present section is dedicated to the study of
the latter problem, whereas the former is investigated in the next section.
In the remainder, X refers to a finite-dimensional real vector space equipped
with a given norm, denoted by ‖ · ‖. Its dual space, X ∗, is equipped with the dual
norm, denoted by ‖ · ‖∗, and 〈·, ·〉 refers to the duality product.
3.1. Preliminaries on accretive mappings.
Set-valued analysis. We recall here some basic definitions about set-valued map-
pings and refer the reader to the monograph [RW09] for more details on the subject.
Given a finite-dimensional real vector space Y, a set-valued mapping A : X ⇒ Y
is a map sending each point of X to a subset of Y. The domain of A is the subset
of X defined by dom(A) := {x ∈ X | A(x) 6= ∅}. The range of A is the subset of Y
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defined by rge(A) :=
⋃
x∈X A(x), and the image of any subset U ⊂ X is the subset
of Y given by A(U) =
⋃
x∈U A(x).
The inverse ofA, denoted by A−1, is the set-valued mapping from Y to X sending
any element y ∈ Y to the set {x ∈ X | y ∈ A(x)}, i.e., such that x ∈ A−1(y) if and
only if y ∈ A(x). In particular, we have (A−1)−1 = A and rge(A) = dom(A−1).
Also note that the image of any set V ⊂ Y by A−1 is given by A−1(V) = {x ∈ X |
A(x) ∩ V 6= ∅}.
We next define notions of continuity for set-valued mappings. The outer limit,
lim supx→x¯A(x), and the inner limit, lim infx→x¯A(x), of A : X ⇒ Y at any point
x¯ ∈ X are subsets of Y defined respectively by the following:
y ∈ lim sup
x→x¯
A(x) ⇐⇒ ∃xk → x¯, ∃yk → y, ∀k ∈ N, yk ∈ A(xk),
y ∈ lim inf
x→x¯
A(x) ⇐⇒ ∀xk → x¯, ∃yk → y, ∃k0 ∈ N, ∀k > k0, yk ∈ A(xk).
Then we can define the notions of outer and inner semicontinuity for set-valued
mappings.
Definition 3.1 (Semicontinuity of set-valued mappings). A set-valued mapping
A : X ⇒ Y is outer semicontinuous (o.s.c. for short) at x¯ ∈ X if
lim sup
x→x¯
A(x) ⊂ A(x¯)
and inner semicontinuous (i.s.c. for short) at x¯ ∈ X if
lim inf
x→x¯
A(x) ⊃ A(x¯).
It is continuous at x¯ if it is both outer and inner semicontinuous.
These notions are invoked relative to any subset U of X containing x¯ if the
properties hold when restricting the convergence x → x¯ to U , i.e., when all the
sequences xk → x¯ are required to lie in U .
Note that if A is i.s.c. at a point x ∈ dom(A), then x ∈ int (dom(A)), the interior
of dom(A). Let us further mention that outer semicontinuity differs from upper
semicontinuity, another notion commonly found in the literature (see e.g., [AF09]).
However, when a set-valued mapping is locally bounded, these two definitions agree.
As for lower semicontinuity, it is equivalent to inner semicontinuity. The reader
can find a discussion on these aspects in [RW09, Ch. 5] (see in particular the
Commentary Section).
Duality mapping. Duality mappings are set-valued mappings that appears in the
study of Banach spaces (see e.g., [Pet70]) or in applications involving nonexpansive
and monotone-like operators (e.g., evolution equations [Bro76], fixed-point approx-
imation [Rei94]). In this paper, we only consider normalized duality mappings and
refer the reader to [Cio90] and the references therein for a general view on the
subject.
Definition 3.2 (Duality mapping). The (normalized) duality mapping on the
normed space (X , ‖ · ‖) is the set-valued mapping J : X ⇒ X ∗ defined by
J(x) = {x∗ ∈ X ∗ | ‖x∗‖∗ = ‖x‖, 〈x, x
∗〉 = ‖x‖2}, x ∈ X .
Note that, by the Hahn-Banach separation theorem, dom(J) = X , i.e., J(x) is
nonempty for every vector x ∈ X . Furthermore, Asplund characterized in [Asp67,
Thm. 1] the image of any point by a duality mapping as the subdifferential at
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this point of some convex function. This entails that J(x) is a compact convex
subset of X ∗ for every x ∈ X . Also, it readily stems from the definition that J
is homogeneous of degree one, i.e., for every x ∈ X and every λ ∈ R, we have
J(λx) = λJ(x). Finally, a straightforward application of the definitions leads to
the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3 (Semicontinuity of duality mappings). Any normalized duality map-
ping on a finite-dimensional vector space is outer semicontinuous. 
Example 3.4. Let X = Rn. If X is equipped with the standard Euclidean norm,
then J is the identity map. More generally, if X is equipped with an Lp norm with
1 < p < +∞, then J is single-valued and given for all x 6= 0 by
J(x) =
‖x‖p
‖x‖q
x
where q is the positive real number defined by p−1 + q−1 = 1.
Example 3.5. Assume that the norm ‖ · ‖ on X is polyhedral (e.g., an L1 or L∞
norm), meaning that there is a finite symmetric family W ⊂ X ∗ of linear forms on
X such that
‖x‖ = max
x∗∈W
〈x, x∗〉, ∀x ∈ X .
For instance, when X is the Euclidean space Rn and {ei}i∈[n] denotes its standard
basis, the family W∞ = {εiei | i ∈ [n], εi = ±1} defines the standard L∞ norm,
whereas the family W1 =
{∑n
i=1 εiei | (εi)i∈[n] ∈ {±1}
n
}
defines the L1 norm.
Then, one may check that, for all x ∈ X ,
J(x) = ‖x‖ co
{
x∗ ∈ W | 〈x, x∗〉 = ‖x‖
}
,
where co(U) denotes the convex hull of any subset U of a vector space.
Accretivity. Accretive operators are generalization in Banach spaces of monotone
operators in Hilbert spaces. They appear in particular in the study of nonlinear
evolution equations (see e.g., [Bro76]), and more recently in game theory ([Vig10,
SV16]).
Definition 3.6 (Accretive mappings). A set-valued mapping A : X ⇒ X is accre-
tive if
∀x, y ∈ X , ∀u ∈ A(x), ∀v ∈ A(y), ∃x∗ ∈ J(x − y), 〈u − v, x∗〉 > 0.
If, in addition, rge(Id+A) = X , where Id denotes the identity map on X , then A
is m-accretive.
Definition 3.7 (Coaccretive mappings). A set-valued maping A : X ⇒ X is coac-
cretive if A−1 is accretive, that is, if
∀x, y ∈ X , ∀u ∈ A(x), ∀v ∈ A(y), ∃x∗ ∈ J(u − v), 〈x− y, x∗〉 > 0.
Let us mention that in a Hilbert space, the normalized duality mapping is
the identity map, so that accretive mappings coincide with monotone operators,
whereas m-accretive mappings coincide with maximally monotone operators. In
particular, for functions form R to R, accretive means nondecreasing, whereas m-
accretive means continuous and nondecreasing. To get an intuition about the results
in this Section, the reader can think of this special case.
We conclude this subsection with few remarks about the latter definitions.
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Remark 3.8. (a) In the literature, one can also find an equivalent definition of
accretivity which does not make use of the duality mapping: a set-valued mapping
A : X ⇒ X is accretive if and only if for every x, y ∈ X , every u ∈ A(x) and
v ∈ A(y), and every λ > 0, we have ‖x − y‖ 6 ‖x − y + λ(u − v)‖ (see [Cio90,
Ch. VI, Prop. 1.3]).
(b) It is known that if A : X ⇒ X is accretive, then rge(Id + λA) = X for every
λ > 0 if and only if rge(Id+λA) = X for some λ > 0 (see Ch. VI, Prop. 1.6, ibid.).
3.2. Surjectivity conditions.
Local boundedness of coaccretive mappings. A set-valued mapping A : X ⇒ X is
locally bounded at a point x ∈ X if there exists a neighborhood U ⊂ X of x such
that A(U) is bounded. It is known that in a reflexive Banach space, an accretive
mapping is locally bounded at any point in the interior of its domain (see [FHK72]).
The following result (which is new, as far as we know) shows that this property
also holds for coaccretive mappings, at least in finite dimension.
Proposition 3.9 (Local boundedness). Let (X , ‖ · ‖) be a finite-dimensional real
vector space and let A : X ⇒ X be a coaccretive mapping. Then, for every point x
in the interior of dom(A), A is locally bounded at x.
Proof. Toward a contradiction, assume that A is not locally bounded at a point
x in the interior of dom(A), that is, for all neighborhoods U of x, A(U) is not
bounded. Then, there exists a sequence (xk, yk)k∈N in X × X such that (xk)k∈N
converges to x, ‖yk‖ tends to infinity, and yk ∈ A(xk) for all integers k. We may
assume that ‖yk‖ > 0 for all k ∈ N. Since the dimension is finite, the bounded
sequence (yk/‖yk‖)k∈N has a convergent subsequence. Let (ynk/‖ynk‖)k∈N be such
a subsequence, which converges toward some point w ∈ X .
The point x being in the interior of dom(A), there exists a scalar α > 0 such
that x + αw ∈ dom(A). Let y¯ ∈ A(x + αw). Since A is coaccretive, then for all
integers k there is a linear form y∗k ∈ J(yk − y¯), where J is the duality mapping
on (X , ‖ · ‖), such that 〈xk − (x + αw), y
∗
k〉 > 0. By homogeneity of the duality
mapping J , for all integers k we have
w∗k =
y∗k
‖yk‖
∈ J
(
yk − y¯
‖yk‖
)
.
In particular, the sequence (w∗k)k∈N is bounded. We also have, for all k ∈ N,
(7) 〈xk − x− αw,w
∗
k〉 > 0.
Let w∗ ∈ X ∗ be a cluster point of the bounded subsequence (w∗nk )k∈N. Since
the subsequence ((ynk − y¯)/‖ynk‖)k∈N converges toward w, and since J is o.s.c.
(Lemma 3.3), then we deduce that w∗ ∈ J(w). On the other hand, Equation (7)
yields 〈w,w∗〉 6 0, a contradiction since 〈w,w∗〉 = ‖w‖2 = 1 by definition of the
duality mapping. 
By application of the Heine-Borel property for compact sets, we readily get the
following.
Corollary 3.10. Let (X , ‖ · ‖) be a finite-dimensional real vector space and let
A : X ⇒ X be a coaccretive mapping. Then, the image by A of any compact subset
of X included in the interior of dom(A) is bounded.
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Characterization of surjectivity. Let us denote by dist(0,U) the distance of the
origin to any set U ⊂ X , i.e., dist(0,U) = infx∈U ‖x‖. We next give a sufficient
condition for an m-accretive mapping to be surjective.
Theorem 3.11 (Sufficient condition of surjectivity, see [KS80, Cor. of Thm. 3]).
Let (X , ‖ · ‖) be a finite-dimensional real vector space and let A : X ⇒ X be an
m-accretive set-valued mapping. Assume that
lim
‖x‖→∞
dist(0, A(x)) = +∞.
Then, rge(A) = X .
We now state the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.12 (Surjectivity of accretive mappings). Let (X , ‖ · ‖) be a finite-
dimensional real vector space and let A : X ⇒ X be an accretive mapping. If
rge(A) = X then, for all scalars α > 0, the set
Dα := {x ∈ X | dist(0, A(x)) 6 α}
is bounded. Moreover, if A is m-accretive, then the two properties are equivalent.
Proof. Assume that rge(A) = X . Equivalently, we have dom(A−1) = X . Moreover,
sinceA is accretive, its inverseA−1 is coaccretive (see Section 3.1). Hence, according
to Corollary 3.10, the image of any compact set by A−1 is bounded.
Let α, α′ be two nonnegative real numbers such that α < α′. If x ∈ Dα, then
A(x) ∩B(0;α′) 6= ∅, where B(0;α′) denotes the closed ball centered at 0 of radius
α′. This proves that Dα ⊂ A−1(B(0;α′)) = {x ∈ X | A(x) ∩ B(0;α′) 6= ∅}. Hence
Dα is bounded.
For the converse, it is readily seen that the coercivity condition in Theorem 3.11
is equivalent to the boundedness of all the sets Dα. Hence the result, when A is
m-accretive.. 
4. Fixed point problems for nonexpansive maps
In this section, we use the main result of the previous one to study problems
related to the existence stability of fixed points of nonexpansive maps. We use the
same notation as before. In particular, (X , ‖ · ‖) shall refer to a finite-dimensional
real normed space. We may sometimes identify a map A : X → X with the set-
valued mapping sending every x ∈ X to {A(x)}. Furthermore, recall that a map
T : X → X is nonexpansive (with respect to ‖ · ‖) if ‖T (x) − T (y)‖ 6 ‖x − y‖ for
all x, y ∈ X .
4.1. Existence stability under additive perturbations. Let us first recall the
classical link between nonexpansive maps and accretive mappings. We give the
proof for the reader’s convenience.
Lemma 4.1. If T : X → X is a nonexpansive map, then the mapping A = Id− T
is m-accretive.
Proof. We first show that A is accretive. Let x, y ∈ X and x∗ ∈ J(x− y), where J
is the duality mapping on (X , ‖ · ‖). We have
〈T (x)− T (y), x∗〉 6 ‖x∗‖∗ ‖T (x)− T (y)‖ 6 ‖x
∗‖∗ ‖x− y‖ = 〈x− y, x
∗〉
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where the first inequality stems from the definition of the dual norm, the second
inequality from the nonexpansiveness of T , and the equality comes from the defi-
nition of J . We deduce that 〈A(x) − A(y), x∗〉 = 〈x − y − (T (x) − T (y)), x∗〉 > 0,
which proves that A is accretive.
Now, let λ > 0 and z ∈ X . One can easily check that the point z is in the range
of Id+λA if and only if the map x 7→ Tλ,z(x) =
λ
1+λT (x)+
1
1+λz has a fixed point.
Since T is nonexpansive, Tλ,z is a contraction. More precisely, for all x, y ∈ X , we
have
‖Tλ,z(x)− Tλ,z(y)‖ 6
λ
1 + λ
‖x− y‖ ,
with λ1+λ < 1. Hence, by the Banach fixed-point theorem, Tλ,z has a (unique)
fixed point. This proves that rge(Id + λA) = X for every λ > 0, and so that A is
m-accretive. 
The following corollary of Theorem 3.12 provides a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for the existence of a fixed point for all additive perturbations of a nonexpansive
map.
Corollary 4.2 (Existence stability of a fixed point). Let (X , ‖ · ‖) be a finite-
dimensional real vector space and let T : X → X be a nonexpansive map. Then,
the following are equivalent:
(i) for every vector g ∈ X , the map g + T has a fixed point;
(ii) every nonexpansive map G : X → X such that supx∈X ‖G(x) − T (x)‖ < ∞
has a fixed point;
(iii) for every scalar α > 0, the set Dα(T ) = {x ∈ X | ‖x−T (x)‖ 6 α} is bounded.
Proof. First, observe that a vector g is in the range of Id−T if and only if the map
g + T has a fixed point. Thus, the equivalence between Item (i) and Item (iii) is
a mere application of Theorem 3.12 to Id − T , which is m-accretive according to
Lemma 4.1. Second, it is straightforward to check that (ii) ⇒ (i).
We now prove that (iii) ⇒ (ii). Assume that Item (iii) holds and let G : X → X
be a nonexpansive map such that supx∈X ‖G(x) − T (x)‖ 6 M for some M > 0.
One can readily check that Dα(G) ⊂ Dα+M (T ) for every α > 0. Hence all the sets
Dα(G) are bounded. Since we have already proved that (i)⇔ (iii), by applying the
equivalence to G we deduce in particular that G has a fixed point. 
4.2. Uniqueness condition. Given a nonexpansive map T : X → X , let us intro-
duce the set-valued mapping Fix : X ⇒ X defined by
(8) Fix(g) = {x ∈ X | g + T (x) = x}, g ∈ X ,
that is, the mapping that sends each vector g ∈ X to the set of fixed points of g+T .
Observe that the inverse mapping of Fix is
Fix−1 = Id− T,
so that Fix is coaccretive by Lemma 4.1. By a straightforward application of the
definition, we have the following.
Lemma 4.3. The fixed-point mapping Fix defined in (8) is outer semicontinuous.
In particular it is closed-valued. 
18 A. HOCHART
We shall need the following technical lemma, which is a variant of the Hahn-
Banach separation theorem.
Lemma 4.4. Let J be the duality mapping on the finite-dimensional normed space
(X , ‖ · ‖), and let x be any vector in X . Then,
x 6= 0 ⇐⇒ ∃w ∈ X \ {0}, ∀x∗ ∈ J(x), 〈w, x∗〉 > 0.
Proof. Let x ∈ X \ {0}. We know that J(x) is a compact convex subset of X ∗
(see Section 3.1). Furthermore, 0 /∈ J(x) by definition. Hence, according to the
Hahn-Banach separation theorem, there exists an affine hyperplane of X ∗ strongly
separating the two compact convex sets J(x) and {0}, i.e., there exists some vector
w ∈ X \ {0} and a constant ε > 0 such that, for all x∗ ∈ J(x), we have 〈w, x∗〉 >
ε > 0.
Conversely, if x = 0, then J(x) = {0} and so, for all w ∈ X , we have 〈w, x∗〉 = 0
with x∗ = 0 ∈ J(x). 
We now state the main result of this subsection.
Theorem 4.5 (Uniqueness of the fixed point). Let (X , ‖·‖) be a finite-dimensional
real vector space and let T : X → X be a nonexpansive map. Then, the fixed-point
mapping Fix : X ⇒ X defined in (8) is continuous at g ∈ dom(Fix) if and only if
g ∈ int (dom(Fix)) and Fix(g) is a singleton, i.e., g + T has a unique fixed point.
Proof. Suppose first that the mapping Fix is single-valued at g ∈ int (dom(Fix))
and denote by x¯ the unique fixed point of g + T . Since Fix = (Id − T )−1 is
coaccretive, we know by Proposition 3.9 that Fix is locally bounded at g. Hence
there is a neighborhood U of g such that Fix(U) is bounded. We may further
assume that U is included in dom(Fix) since g ∈ int (dom(Fix)).
We next show that Fix is i.s.c. at g. Let (gk)k∈N be any sequence in U that
converges to g. Since U ⊂ dom(Fix), for every k ∈ N there exists some xk ∈
Fix(gk). The sequence (xk)k∈N, being in Fix(U), is bounded. Let x be any cluster
point. By continuity of T , we necessarily have x ∈ Fix(g), hence x = x¯. This
proves that the sequence (xk)k∈N converges to x¯, and so, that Fix is i.s.c. at g.
Since Fix is also o.s.c. at g (Lemma 4.3), we deduce that it is continuous at g.
Conversely, suppose that Fix is continuous at a point g ∈ dom(Fix). Then, by
definition of inner semicontinuity, g ∈ int (dom(Fix)). Let x and y be two points in
Fix(g). Let w ∈ X \{0} and for every positive integer k, define gk = g−k−1w. We
may assume, without loss of generality, that gk is in dom(Fix) for all k. Since Fix
is continuous at g, hence inner semicontinuous, there exists a sequence of elements
xk ∈ Fix(gk) converging to x. Furthermore, since Fix is coaccretive, for all k ∈ N
there exists a point x∗k ∈ J(xk − y) (where J is the duality mapping on (X , ‖ · ‖))
such that 〈gk − g, x
∗
k〉 > 0, which yields 〈w, x
∗
k〉 6 0.
Let x∗ ∈ X ∗ be a cluster point of the bounded sequence (x∗k)k∈N. From the
latter inequality, we get 〈w, x∗〉 6 0. Moreover, since the duality mapping J is
o.s.c. (Lemma 3.3), we also have x∗ ∈ J(x− y). Thus, we have proved that for any
point w ∈ X \ {0}, there exists an element x∗ ∈ J(x − y) such that 〈w, x∗〉 6 0.
We deduce from Lemma 4.4 that x − y = 0, and consequently that Fix(g) is a
singleton. 
4.3. Generic uniqueness. Semicontinuous mappings are “generically” continu-
ous. Before making this fact precise, let us explain the terminology. A subset B
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of a set W ⊂ X is nowhere dense in W if the interior relative to W of the closure
relative to W of B is empty:
intW (clW(B)) = ∅.
A subset of W ⊂ X is meager in W if it is a countable union of nowhere dense
subsets in W . Dually, the complement of a meager set in W is the intersection of
countably many subsets with dense interiors relative to W . Note that when W is
open or closed in X , a fortiori when W = X , the complement of any meager set in
W is dense in W .
Theorem 4.6 (Generic continuity of set-valued mappings, see [RW09, Thm. 5.55]).
Let A : X ⇒ X be a closed-valued mapping. If A is outer (resp., inner) semicon-
tinuous relative to W ⊂ X (see Definition 3.1), then the set of points where A fails
to be continuous relative to W is meager in W.
We know from Lemma 4.3 that the fixed-point mapping is o.s.c. and closed-
valued. Hence, a straightforward combination of Theorem 4.5 and Theorem 4.6
leads to the following.
Theorem 4.7 (Generic uniqueness of the fixed point). Let T be a nonexpansive
self-map on a finite-dimensional real vector space (X , ‖·‖). Let Fix : X ⇒ X be the
fixed-point mapping defined in (8). Then the set of points g ∈ int (dom(Fix)) where
g+ T fails to have a unique fixed point is meager in int (dom(Fix)). In particular,
when dom(Fix) = X , the set of points g ∈ X where g + T has a unique fixed point
is dense in X . 
5. Application to Shapley operators and stochastic games
In this section, we first apply the results of the previous one to the case of mono-
tone additively homogeneous operators. Since this includes in particular the case of
Shapley operators, a proof of Theorem 2.6 readily follows. Then, we use a combina-
torial criterion for the boundedness in Hilbert’s seminorm of all the slice spaces of
any monotone additively homogeneous operator (announced in [AGH15b]) to derive
the ergodicity condition in terms of dominions which appears in Theorem 2.11.
5.1. From fixed-point to ergodicity problems. In this subsection, we show
how the solvability of the ergodic equation (5) for a monotone additively homoge-
neous map is equivalent to a fixed point problem involving a nonexpansive map in
some finite-dimensional normed space. We then adapt the results of Section 4 to
the former problem (solvability of the ergodic equation). This provides in particular
a characterization of ergodic stochastic games, stated in Theorem 2.6 which .
Let TPn := Rn/Re be the quotient space of Rn by the subspace Re, i.e., the
set of equivalence classes over Rn by the following relation: x ∼ y if there exists
α ∈ R such that x − y = αe. We denote by [x] the equivalence class of any vector
x ∈ Rn modulo the relation ∼. Observe that for any x, y ∈ Rn such that x ∼ y,
we have ‖x‖H = ‖y‖H, where Hilbert’s seminorm ‖ · ‖H is defined in (6). Thus,
Hilbert’s seminorm can be quotiented into a map, which we denote by qH, over TP
n.
Furthermore, this quotiented seminorm is now a norm since qH([x]) = ‖x‖H = 0
if and only if x ∼ 0, that is, [x] = 0. This makes (TPn, qH) a finite-dimensional
normed vector space.
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Any monotone additively homogeneous map T : Rn → Rn can be quotiented into
a map [T ] : TPn → TPn, sending any equivalence class [x] to [T (x)]. Furthermore,
it is known that such a map T is nonexpansive with respect to Hilbert’s seminorm
(see e.g., [GG04]), that is,
‖T (x)− T (y)‖H 6 ‖x− y‖H, ∀x, y ∈ R
n.
Hence the quotiented map [T ] is nonexpansive with respect to the norm qH. Ob-
serve further that (λ, u) ∈ R × Rn is a solution of Equation (5) if and only if the
equivalence class [u] ∈ TPn is a fixed point of [T ]. Moreover, the uniqueness of the
fixed point of [T ] is equivalent to the uniqueness up to an additive constant of the
solution of (5), meaning that any solution of (5) is of the form (λ, u + αe) with
α ∈ R.
The latter considerations allow us to adapt the results of Section 4 to the setting
of monotone additively homogeneous maps, which includes in particular the case
of Shapley operators of stochastic games. The next theorem, from which readily
follows Theorem 2.6, gives stability conditions for the solvability of the ergodic
equation (5).
Theorem 5.1 (Stability of the ergodic equation). Let T : Rn → Rn be a monotone
additively homogeneous map. The following assertions are equivalent.
(i) Equation (5) has a solution for all maps g + T with g ∈ Rn;
(ii) Equation (5) has a solution for all monotone additively homogeneous maps
G : Rn → Rn such that supx∈Rn ‖G(x)− T (x)‖H <∞;
(iii) the set DHα (T ) := {x ∈ R
n | ‖x−T (x)‖H 6 α} is bounded in Hilbert’s seminorm
for all α > 0;
(iv) the slice space Sβα(T ) = {x ∈ R
n | αe + x 6 T (x) 6 βe + x} is bounded in
Hilbert’s seminorm for all α, β ∈ R.
Proof. The equivalence between Items (i) to (iii) is a straightforward application of
Corollary 4.2 to the nonexpansive map [T ] on (TPn, qH).
Second, it follows from the definition of Hilbert’s seminorm that Sβα(T ) ⊂ D
H
γ (T )
whenever β − α 6 γ. Hence (iii) implies (iv).
Finally, we already know that (iv) implies (i). It has been proved in Section 2.3
(this is an easy consequence of Theorem 2.3). 
We now address the uniqueness up to an additive constant of the solution to
Equation (5). From Theorem 4.7 we get the following corollary.
Corollary 5.2 (Generic uniqueness of the solution of the ergodic equation). Let
T : Rn → Rn be a monotone additively homogeneous map. Assume that the ergodic
equation (5) is solvable for all maps g + T with g ∈ Rn. Then, the set of vectors
g ∈ Rn for which the ergodic equation (5) with g+T fails to have a unique solution
up to an additive constant is meager.
Proof. Since [g] + [T ] = [g + T ] has a fixed point for all [g] ∈ TPn, we know from
Theorem 4.7 that the set of points [g] where [g] + [T ] fails to have a unique fixed
point is meager in TPn. Let
⋃
k∈N Bk be this set, where for all k ∈ N, Bk is nowhere
dense in TPn. Denote by π : Rn → TPn the quotient map. Then the set of points
g ∈ Rn where Equation (5) fails to have a unique solution up to an additive constant
for g + T is π−1
(⋃
k∈N Bk
)
=
⋃
k∈N π
−1(Bk).
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To complete the proof, we need to show that all the sets π−1(Bk), k ∈ N, are
nowhere dense in Rn. To that purpose, we next prove that the preimage by π of
any set B nowhere dense in TPn is nowhere dense in Rn. Let U be an open set
included in cl
(
π−1(B)
)
, the closure of π−1(B). Since π is continuous, we have
cl
(
π−1(B)
)
⊂ π−1 (cl(B)), which yields
π(U) ⊂ π
(
π−1 (cl(B))
)
= cl(B).
Furthermore, since π is a surjective continuous linear operator, then it is an open
map according to the Banach-Schauder theorem, and so π(U) is open. We deduce
that π(U) is empty, since B is nowhere dense in TPn. As a consequence, we finally
have U = ∅, which proves that int
(
cl
(
π−1(B)
))
= ∅, i.e., π−1(B) is nowhere dense
in Rn. 
5.2. Geometric ergodicity conditions. In [AGH15b], Akian et al. gave a com-
binatorial criterion (in terms of hypergraph) for the boundedness in Hilbert’s semi-
norm of all the slice spaces of a monotone additively homogeneous map T : Rn → Rn
(see also the preprint [AGH18]). This criterion boils down to the following result,
where, for any set L ⊂ [n], we denote by eL the vector in Rn with entries equal to
1 on L and 0 elsewhere.
Proposition 5.3 (Boundedness of all slice spaces, [AGH15b]). All the slice spaces
of a monotone additively homogeneous map T : Rn → Rn are bounded in Hilbert’s
seminorm if and only if there exist two disjoint nonempty subsets of [n], I and J ,
satisfying, respectively,
∀i ∈ I, lim
κ→−∞
Ti(κ e[n]\I) > −∞ and ∀j ∈ J, lim
κ→+∞
Tj(κ e[n]\J) < +∞.
We next show that the latter conditions can be interpreted in game-theoretical
terms, involving dominions (Definition 2.9), when T arises as the Shapley operator
of a stochastic game satisfying Assumption A. To that purpose, let us first give a
simpler characterization of dominions in terms of pure actions.
To prove the following lemma, we shall use the notion of support of a Borel
measure µ on a Borel space X . We recall that if this support exists, it is the unique
nonempty closed set, denoted by suppµ, satisfying
• µ(X \ suppµ) = 0;
• if U ⊂ X is open and U ∩ suppµ 6= ∅, then µ(U ∩ suppµ) > 0;
(see e.g., [AB06]). Note that if µ is a Borel probability measure, then it is regular
(see Theorem 12.7, ibid.) which implies that suppµ exists (see Theorem 12.14,
ibid.).
Lemma 5.4 (Characterization of dominions). Let Γ be a stochastic game satisfying
Assumption A. A subset of states D is a dominion of player Max (resp., Min) if
and only if
∀i ∈ D, ∃a¯ ∈ Ai, ∀b ∈ Bi, p(D | i, a¯, b) = 1(9) (
resp., ∀i ∈ D, ∃b¯ ∈ Bi, ∀a ∈ Ai, p(D | i, a, b¯) = 1
)
.(10)
Proof. First assume that (9) holds and consider any pure stationary strategy σ¯ of
playerMax that assigns to every current position i ∈ D an action a¯i ∈ Ai satisfying
(9). Let τ be any strategy of player Min and let {ik}k>0 be a sequence of states
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generated by the pair (σ¯, τ) with an initial state i0 ∈ D. Conditioning on the first
exit time, the probability that the state leaves D at some stage is
P ({ik} 6⊂ D) =
∑
k>0
P (ik+1 /∈ D | {iℓ}06ℓ6k ⊂ D) P ({iℓ}06ℓ6k ⊂ D) .
With the particular choice of σ¯ that we made, we have, for every stage k > 0,
P (ik+1 /∈ D | {iℓ}06ℓ6k ⊂ D) 6 max
b∈Bi
k
p([n] \D | ik, a¯ik , b) = 0.
Hence, the probability that the state leaves D at some stage is 0, that is, D is a
dominion of player Max.
Conversely, assume that D is a dominion of player Max. Then, by definition of
dominions, for every initial state i ∈ D, there exists a mixed action µ¯ ∈ ∆(Ai) of
playerMax such that for all mixed actions of playerMin, hence for all pure actions
b ∈ Bi, the probability p(D | i, µ¯, b) that the next state remains in D is equal to 1.
Take a¯ ∈ supp µ¯ and assume, working toward a contradiction, that there exists
some b¯ ∈ Bi such that p(D | i, a¯, b¯) < 1. Since the function a 7→ p([n] \D | i, a, b¯) is
continuous (see Remark 2.1) and positive in a¯, then there exists a scalar ε > 0 and
an open neighborhood U of a¯ such that p([n] \D | i, a, b¯) > ε for all a ∈ U . This
implies that
p([n] \D | i, µ¯, b¯) >
∫
U
p([n] \D | i, a, b¯) dµ¯(a) > ε µ¯(U).
However, since U ∩supp µ¯ is nonempty (it contains a¯), it follows from the definition
of the support of a measure that µ¯(U) > µ¯(U ∩ supp µ¯) > 0. This implies that
p([n] \D | i, µ¯, b¯) > 0, or equivalently p(D | i, µ¯, b¯) < 1, a contradiction. So, for all
b ∈ Bi, we have p(D | i, a¯, b) = 1, hence (9) is satisfied. With dual arguments we
can show that the dominions of player Min are characterized by (10). 
Example 5.5. Consider the game introduced in Example 2.10, whose transition
function is defined, for all actions a ∈ [0, 1] of player Max and b ∈ [0, 1] of player
Min, by
p(1, a, b) =
 γab (1− γa)
(1 − b) (1− γa)
, p(2, a, b) =
 γba (1− γb)
(1 − a) (1− γb)
, p(3, a, b) =
00
1
,
where γ is a fixed parameter in (0, 1). With Lemma 5.4 in mind, it is now straight-
forward to check that the dominions of player Max are {3} and {1, 2, 3}, whereas
the dominions of player Min are {3}, {1, 3}, {2, 3} and {1, 2, 3}.
Remark 5.6. We easily deduce from the proof of the latter result that a dominion
D of player Max (resp., Min) in Γ is also characterized by the following equality:
max
µ∈∆(Ai)
min
ν∈∆(Bi)
p(D | i, µ, ν) = 1(
resp., max
µ∈∆(Ai)
min
ν∈∆(Bi)
p([n] \D | i, µ, ν) = 0
)
,
where the minimum and the maximum commutes.
We can now identify the sets of states satisfying one of the asymptotic proper-
ties in Proposition 5.3. This characterization (which is established in the following
lemma) combined with Proposition 5.3 and Theorem 2.6, yields the dominion con-
dition for ergodicity of stochastic games announced in Theorem 2.11.
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Lemma 5.7 (Dominions and asymptotic behavior of the Shapley operator). Let
Γ be a stochastic game satisfying Assumption A, with Shapley operator T . A set
D ⊂ [n] is a dominion of player Max (resp., Min) in Γ if and only if
∀i ∈ D, lim
κ→−∞
Ti(κ e[n]\D) > −∞,(11) (
resp., ∀i ∈ D, lim
κ→+∞
Ti(κ e[n]\D) < +∞
)
.(12)
Proof. Assume first that D is a dominion of player Max in Γ. Then, according to
Lemma 5.4, for every i ∈ D there exists an action a¯ ∈ Ai such that p(D | i, a¯, b) = 1
for all b ∈ Bi. Hence, for all real numbers κ 6 0 we have
Ti(κe[n]\D) > min
ν∈∆(Bi)
{
r(i, a¯, ν) +
∑
ℓ/∈D
κ p(ℓ | i, a¯, ν)
}
= min
ν∈∆(Bi)
{
r(i, a¯, ν) + κ p([n] \D | i, a¯, ν)
}
= min
ν∈∆(Bi)
r(i, a¯, ν).
Since the map ν 7→ r(i, a¯, ν) is l.s.c. on ∆(Bi) and since the latter set is compact,
we deduce that the right-hand side of the above inequality is finite. This shows
that (11) is true.
Conversely, assume that (11) holds true. Let i ∈ D and let ν ∈ ∆(Bi) be a
mixed action of player Min. Since the map µ 7→ r(i, µ, ν) is u.s.c. on ∆(Ai) and
since the latter set is compact, there exists some r∗ ∈ R such that r(i, µ, ν) 6 r∗
for all µ ∈ ∆(Ai). Then we have for all κ 6 0
Ti(κ e[n]\D) 6 max
µ∈∆(Ai)
{
r(i, µ, ν) +
∑
ℓ/∈D
κ p(ℓ | i, µ, ν)
}
6 r∗ + max
µ∈∆(Ai)
{∑
ℓ/∈D
κ p(ℓ | i, µ, ν)
}
= r∗ + κ min
µ∈∆(Ai)
p([n] \D | i, µ, ν).
The left-hand term in the latter inequality being lower-bounded, we deduce that,
for all ν ∈ ∆(Bi),
min
µ∈∆(Ai)
p([n] \D | i, µ, ν) 6 0
or, equivalently,
max
µ∈∆(Ai)
p(D | i, µ, ν) > 1.
Since the above maximum is also lower than 1, we have
min
ν∈∆(Bi)
max
µ∈∆(Ai)
p(D | i, µ, ν) = max
µ∈∆(Ai)
min
ν∈∆(Bi)
p(D | i, µ, ν) = 0.
Thus, Remark 5.6 yields that D is a dominion of player Max in Γ. With dual
arguments we can show that the same is true for the dominions of player Min. 
Theorem 2.11 shows that the ergodicity of a stochastic game Γ is a structural
property, in the sense that it only depends on the transition probabilities. The fol-
lowing immediate corollary makes this observation even clearer. However, we draw
the attention of the reader to the fact that Assumption A is not only sufficient but
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also necessary for this characteristic to hold, as already explained in Remark 2.15
and illustrated with Example 2.8.
Before stating the result, let us fix some notation. First, we shall say for brevity
that a function g : K → R is u.s.c./l.s.c. if, for all (i, a, b) ∈ K, g(i, ·, b) is u.s.c.
and g(i, a, ·) is l.s.c. Second, we next consider a parametric family of stochastic
games for which all the data are fixed except the payoff function r. In order to
highlight this dependency, we shall use the notation Γ(r) to refer to the game
([n], A,B,KA,KB, r, p).
Corollary 5.8. Let Γ(r) be a stochastic game satisfying Assumption A. The fol-
lowing assertions are equivalent:
(i) Γ(r) is ergodic;
(ii) Γ(0), i.e., the game with all payoffs equal to 0, is ergodic;
(iii) for all Borel measurable u.s.c./l.s.c. payoff functions r˜ : K → R which are
bounded below or above, the ergodic equation (5) is solvable for the Shapley
operator of Γ(r˜).
References
[AB06] C. D. Aliprantis and K. C. Border, Infinite dimensional analysis: a hitchhiker’s guide,
third ed., Springer, Berlin, 2006.
[AF09] J.-P. Aubin and H. Frankowska, Set-valued analysis, Modern Birkha¨user Classics,
Birkha¨user Boston, Inc., Boston, MA, 2009, Reprint of the 1990 edition.
[AGH15a] M. Akian, S. Gaubert, and A. Hochart, Ergodicity conditions for zero-sum games,
Discrete Contin. Dyn. Syst. 35 (2015), no. 9, 3901–3931.
[AGH15b] , Hypergraph conditions for the solvability of the ergodic equation for zero-sum
games, 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (Osaka, Japan), December
2015, arXiv:1510.05396, pp. 5845–5850.
[AGH18] , A game theory approach to the existence and uniqueness of nonlinear Perron-
Frobenius eigenvectors, Preprint, 2018.
[AHS97] E. Altman, A. Hordijk, and F. M. Spieksma, Contraction conditions for average and α-
discount optimality in countable state Markov games with unbounded rewards, Math.
Oper. Res. 22 (1997), no. 3, 588–618.
[Asp67] E. Asplund, Positivity of duality mappings, Bull. Amer. Math. Soc. 73 (1967), 200–
203.
[Bat73] J. Bather, Optimal decision procedures for finite Markov chains. II. Communicating
systems, Advances in Appl. Probability 5 (1973), 521–540.
[BEGM10] E. Boros, K. Elbassioni, V. Gurvich, and K. Makino, A pumping algorithm for er-
godic stochastic mean payoff games with perfect information, Integer programming
and combinatorial optimization, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., vol. 6080, Springer,
Berlin, 2010, pp. 341–354.
[BG93] V. S. Borkar and M. K. Ghosh, Denumerable state stochastic games with limiting
average payoff, J. Optim. Theory Appl. 76 (1993), no. 3, 539–560.
[BGV15] J. Bolte, S. Gaubert, and G. Vigeral, Definable zero-sum stochastic games, Math.
Oper. Res. 40 (2015), no. 1, 171–191.
[BK76] T. Bewley and E. Kohlberg, The asymptotic theory of stochastic games, Math. Oper.
Res. 1 (1976), no. 3, 197–208.
[Bro76] F. E. Browder, Nonlinear operators and nonlinear equations of evolution in Banach
spaces, 1–308.
[Cio90] I. Cioranescu, Geometry of Banach spaces, duality mappings and nonlinear problems,
Mathematics and its Applications, vol. 62, Kluwer Academic Publishers Group, Dor-
drecht, 1990.
[CT80] M. G. Crandall and L. Tartar, Some relations between nonexpansive and order pre-
serving mappings, Proc. Amer. Math. Soc. 78 (1980), no. 3, 385–390.
ERGODIC STOCHASTIC GAMES 25
[Eve57] H. Everett, Recursive games, Contributions to the theory of games, vol. 3, Annals
of Mathematics Studies, no. 39, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J., 1957,
pp. 47–78.
[FHK72] P. M. Fitzpatrick, P. Hess, and T. Kato, Local boundedness of monotone-type opera-
tors, Proc. Japan Acad. 48 (1972), 275–277.
[GB98] M. K. Ghosh and A. Bagchi, Stochastic games with average payoff criterion, Appl.
Math. Optim. 38 (1998), no. 3, 283–301.
[GG04] S. Gaubert and J. Gunawardena, The Perron-Frobenius theorem for homogeneous,
monotone functions, Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 356 (2004), no. 12, 4931–4950 (elec-
tronic).
[GL89] V. A. Gurvich and V. N. Lebedev, A criterion and verification of the ergodicity of
cyclic game forms, Uspekhi Mat. Nauk 44 (1989), no. 1(265), 193–194.
[HK66] A. J. Hoffman and R. M. Karp, On nonterminating stochastic games, Management
Sci. 12 (1966), 359–370.
[HLL00] O. Herna´ndez-Lerma and J. B. Lasserre, Zero-sum stochastic games in Borel spaces:
average payoff criteria, SIAM J. Control Optim. 39 (2000), no. 5, 1520–1539.
[Hoc16] A. Hochart, An accretive operator approach to ergodic problems for zero-sum games,
22nd International Symposium on Mathematical Theory of Networks and Systems
(Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA), July 2016, arXiv:1605.04520, hdl:11299/181518,
pp. 315–318.
[JN01] A. Jas´kiewicz and A. S. Nowak, On the optimality equation for zero-sum ergodic
stochastic games, Math. Methods Oper. Res. 54 (2001), no. 2, 291–301.
[JPZ08] M. Jurdzin´ski, M. Paterson, and U. Zwick, A deterministic subexponential algorithm
for solving parity games, SIAM J. Comput. 38 (2008), no. 4, 1519–1532.
[Koh74] E. Kohlberg, Repeated games with absorbing states, Ann. Statist. 2 (1974), 724–738.
[KS76] J. G. Kemeny and J. L. Snell, Finite Markov chains, Springer-Verlag, New York-
Heidelberg, 1976, Reprinting of the 1960 original, Undergraduate Texts in Mathemat-
ics.
[KS80] W. A. Kirk and R. Scho¨neberg, Zeros of m-accretive operators in Banach spaces,
Israel J. Math. 35 (1980), no. 1-2, 1–8.
[Ku¨e01] H.-U. Ku¨enle, On multichain Markov games, Advances in dynamic games and ap-
plications (Maastricht, 1998), Ann. Internat. Soc. Dynam. Games, vol. 6, Birkha¨user
Boston, Boston, MA, 2001, pp. 147–163.
[LN12] B. Lemmens and R. D. Nussbaum, Nonlinear Perron-Frobenius theory, Cambridge
Tracts in Mathematics, vol. 189, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012.
[MN81] J.-F. Mertens and A. Neyman, Stochastic games, Internat. J. Game Theory 10 (1981),
no. 2, 53–66.
[MNR09] J.-F. Mertens, A. Neyman, and D. Rosenberg, Absorbing games with compact action
spaces, Math. Oper. Res. 34 (2009), no. 2, 257–262.
[MSZ15] J.-F. Mertens, S. Sorin, and S. Zamir, Repeated games, Econometric Society Mono-
graphs, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2015, With a foreword by Robert J.
Aumann.
[Ney03] A. Neyman, Stochastic games and nonexpansive maps, Stochastic games and applica-
tions (Stony Brook, NY, 1999), NATO Sci. Ser. C Math. Phys. Sci., vol. 570, Kluwer
Acad. Publ., Dordrecht, 2003, pp. 397–415.
[NS03] A. Neyman and S. Sorin, Stochastic games and applications, Nato Science Series C,
vol. 570, Springer Netherlands, 2003.
[Nus88] R. D. Nussbaum, Hilbert’s projective metric and iterated nonlinear maps, Mem. Amer.
Math. Soc. 75 (1988), no. 391, iv+137.
[Pet70] W. V. Petryshyn, A characterization of strict convexity of Banach spaces and other
uses of duality mappings, J. Functional Analysis 6 (1970), 282–291.
[Rei94] S. Reich, Approximating fixed points of nonexpansive mappings, Panamer. Math. J. 4
(1994), no. 2, 23–28.
[Ren11] J. Renault, Uniform value in dynamic programming, J. Eur. Math. Soc. (JEMS) 13
(2011), no. 2, 309–330.
[RS01] D. Rosenberg and S. Sorin, An operator approach to zero-sum repeated games, Israel
J. Math. 121 (2001), 221–246.
26 A. HOCHART
[RW09] R. T. Rockafellar and R. J.-B. Wets, Variational analysis, Grundlehren der Mathema-
tischen Wissenschaften [Fundamental Principles of Mathematical Sciences], vol. 317,
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2009, Reprint of the 1998 edition.
[Sen94] L. I. Sennott, Zero-sum stochastic games with unbounded costs: discounted and aver-
age cost cases, Z. Oper. Res. 39 (1994), no. 2, 209–225.
[Sha53] L. S. Shapley, Stochastic games, Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 39 (1953), 1095–1100.
[Sor03] S. Sorin, The operator approach to zero-sum stochastic games, Stochastic games and
applications (Stony Brook, NY, 1999), NATO Sci. Ser. C Math. Phys. Sci., vol. 570,
Kluwer Acad. Publ., Dordrecht, 2003, pp. 417–426.
[Sor04] , Asymptotic properties of monotonic nonexpansive mappings, Discrete Event
Dyn. Syst. 14 (2004), no. 1, 109–122.
[SV16] S. Sorin and G. Vigeral, Operator approach to values of stochastic games with varying
stage duration, Internat. J. Game Theory 45 (2016), no. 1-2, 389–410.
[Vig10] G. Vigeral, Evolution equations in discrete and continuous time for nonexpansive
operators in Banach spaces, ESAIM Control Optim. Calc. Var. 16 (2010), no. 4, 809–
832.
[Vig13] , A zero-zum stochastic game with compact action sets and no asymptotic
value, Dyn. Games Appl. 3 (2013), no. 2, 172–186.
[Vri03] O. J. Vrieze, Stochastic games and stationary strategies, Stochastic games and appli-
cations (Stony Brook, NY, 1999), NATO Sci. Ser. C Math. Phys. Sci., vol. 570, Kluwer
Acad. Publ., Dordrecht, 2003, pp. 37–50.
[Zil16a] B. Ziliotto, A tauberian theorem for nonexpansive operators and applications to zero-
sum stochastic games, Math. Oper. Res. 41 (2016), no. 4, 1522–1534.
[Zil16b] , Zero-sum repeated games: Counterexamples to the existence of the asymptotic
value and the conjecture maxmin = lim vn, Ann. Probab. 44 (2016), no. 2, 1107–1133.
Universidad Adolfo Iba´n˜ez, Santiago, Chile
E-mail address: antoine.hochart@gmail.com
